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‘Why is it important’, asks Harold Berman, in his Preface to the second volume of his Law and 
Revolution, ‘to remember the influence of Roman Catholic and Protestant Christianity on the 
Western legal tradition in past centuries?’ His answer is as elegant as it is accurate: ‘First 
because we are the heirs of that tradition and our law is a product of those influences. We cannot 
understand what our legal institutions are if we do not know how they came to be what they are, 
just as we cannot know who we are if we do not know how we came to be who we are. Our 
history is our group memory, without which we as a group are lost. If we live only in the present 
we suffer from memory impairment, a kind of social amnesia, not knowing whence we came or 
whither we are going.’1 That the West suffers from serious social amnesia is a major concern of 
Berman and one important reason why he believed it necessary to write his work. Moreover, for 
Berman, the condition is seriously aggravated by the increasingly deep cleavage in modern time 
between law and religion, itself a symptom of what he calls ‘a nervous breakdown’ stemming 
from an ‘integrity crisis.’2   
 Berman’s fears of the West’s ‘social amnesia’ and its ‘integrity crisis’ has a significant  
meaning for any role that the law might play in global governance. For just as law provides the 
                                                          
1 Harold J. Berman Law and revolution Vol. II: The Impact of the Protestant reformations on the Western legal 
Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. x. His first volume  subtitled The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, (1987) focused on the catholic church, particularly in light of the 
Gregorian or Papal revolution (to students of the history of political theory usually called the investiture conflict) 
and its aftermath.  
2 Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion, (Scholars Press, 1993), 1-2 
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skeletal structure that channels and curbs the massive interplay of  human energies domestically 
and in federated unions such as  the EU, irrespective of what exactly a global order will look 
like, it will only be at all if it is lawful. For it is law – in cooperation with politics and justice – 
that is required to tend to  the elements of discord which, left unattended, would bring the most 
essential pathways of the body politic  into chaos.3 Law, however, does not establish order ex 
nihilo, as Iredell Jenkins has rightly observed in a sadly neglected work, it ‘is always a 
supplementary principle of order. It arises to strengthen and refine earlier principles of order, but 
it depends equally upon these, and it cannot supplant them.’4 The all too obvious limitations of 
international law stem from the fact that ‘the bodies’ subject to that law are still not sufficiently 
orderly in their interaction for a supplementary principle to have effect. International law is 
evolving all the time, but there is no political will to give international  law the leverage that is 
necessary to give it a function analogous to laws which take place where there is a congealed 
political will. Yet, as Jenkins also points out the supplementary principle of order that takes the 
form of positive law ‘arises and develops in the human context when other agencies and forces 
become inadequate to the conditions and the challenges that man confronts.’5 Bearing in mind 
our previous point, the two citations from Jenkins point to an important fact about law, namely, 
that law establishes order where other alternatives are not thought to be available (though, of 
course, more legislatively enthusiastic governments may well introduce unnecessary laws)  but it 
can only do so where this is sufficient order for law to be effective and taken seriously. Of 
course, states teetering on chaos or on the verge of civil war still have laws, but it is inevitable 
                                                          
3 Having said that, the corollary is that excessive legal insistence on limiting human randomness, and an excessive 
recourse to law is a real threat to social order, and a very serious problem in Western democracies where 
governments are continually elected with platforms to make new laws to serve different interest groups. The 
expansion of interest groups and the politicization of the law are in danger of generating  widespread cynicism of 
the law.  
4 Iredell Jenkins, Social Order and the Limits of Law, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980 
5 Jenkins, 19. 
3 
 
that in such states that the legal order will be compromised by political intrigue, desperate acts of 
state survival, procedural violations and the like. Law is, to repeat, a supplement, or we might 
say a second order principle: it will not be effective in all environments.  
Law is also the answer to a social need, and that need has to be adequately recognized 
before the solution to the need can be applied. The World Wars of the 20th century and the 
subsequent communications revolution certainly provided the need. But it seems that human 
beings are slow to recognize their needs. Whereas the French and Germans (and the Benelux 
nations) recognized the need for a greater system of order than could be supplied by nation states 
and an international legislative body (the UN) which was unable to provide order when it was 
intrinsically absent, they only did so after the mutual trauma of two World Wars. Eventually a 
significant number of other European nations would become part of that supranational body of 
law. The European Union was, of course, slower rather than quicker in coming because of the 
ideological polarization which hung over post-World War 2 Europe and was too great to be 
ameliorated by  law. The reason that the EU is now able to exist is that a sense of common 
interests is adequately supported by an  ideological consensus – and one of the most clever 
aspects of the EU has been its fusion of liberal/ free-market and socialistic/ welfarist policies.  
Much of the rest of the world which was not so devastated by the Second World War, however, 
does not have sufficient need to surrender national political sovereignty, nor are these nations 
convinced that the economic benefits of entering into a supranational order  will benefit them.  
 The fact that it is Europe which is leading the way in the actualization of supra-national 
economic cooperation, governance and legislation is, as I have suggested, closely allied to its 
heavily traumatic past. One might well argue that the European Union has little to do with what 
lies outside of Europe. The reason I am not convinced of this is that the Union, for all its 
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paperwork, bureaucracy, seemingly chatter etc., is a model of economic, political and legal 
cooperation which manages to retain the nation state, yet assist in overcoming important 
obstacles that are caused by the nation state. That the nation state is ubiquitous in the 
international scheme of ‘order’ is indisputable today. In so far as the strengthening of the power 
of the state  and its legislative scope was, in part, at least a solution to the problem of the 
religious wars  that plagued Europe, and in so far as nationalism was a solution to potentially 
interminable European class conflicts, we can see that the dominant institution today that plays 
upon the political stage of the world  was a European, more specifically, Western European 
artifice.  The fact that the nation state was also a European solution to what was originally a 
European problem, but then later a world problem, suggests something that is at the basis of 
Berman’s enterprise, and which was a central idea of the teacher who inspired Berman’s work on 
law and revolutions, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.6  
That idea is that the West has been shaped by a certain understanding of speech, time, 
and history. The fact that the West has largely forgotten how it arrived at where it is, was not 
only a major motivation behind Berman’s work on law and revolution, but also behind his 
teacher’s, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s two great studies of revolutions, Out of Revolution and 
Die europäischen Revolutionen und de Charakter der Nationen, which provided the original idea 
for Berman’s own undertaking.7  
Rosenstock-Huessy’s own ideas had evolved to a large extent through his dialogue with 
his best friend, Franz Rosenzweig. Rosenzweig, was the most important Jewish German thinker 
between the two world wars – he would die in 1929 after  having been bed ridden for the last 
                                                          
6 Berman himself says that he has applied Rosenstock-Huessy’s method to the study of the history of Western law, 
Law and Revolution, Vol. 2, 21.  
7 These were not his only studies, but they draw all his important ideas together. Also see chapter 1 of Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy, Ja und Nein Auto-biographische Fragmente, (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1968). 
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years of his life with the motor neuron disease, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis. Together they 
both pushed and prodded each other, through often very acrimonious exchanges, to write their 
own respective systems based upon what both had called speech thinking or new thinking 
(Rosenzweig would even publish a small book called The New Thinking where he would call 
Rosenstock-Huessy his most important source of inspiration for this new thinking.) 
Rosenzweig’s system appeared first, when he was 35 years old,  in 1921, in the form of the book 
the author of The Star of Redemption,  Rosenstock-Huessy’s system – his two volume work of 
Sociology (Die Soziologie), would not appear until he was seventy years old (his works on 
revolution are more detailed elaborations of parts of his system.)  
The great source of their inventiveness and their creative antagonism came from the fact 
that they were both deeply attuned to the intellectual currents of the time, and were especially 
influenced by Nietzsche and Goethe, but they both agreed that it was impossible to understand 
the nature of the West without understanding its history, and that its history could not be grasped  
without understanding its religion. Indeed, by his own admission it had been Rosenstock-Huessy 
who first showed Rosenzweig (he had met Rosenstock-Huessy when he attended lectures of his 
own Medieval Law) the meaning of religion. For Rosenstock-Huessy, religion quite simply 
meant the means by which a people directs itself to its future. Thus – and this idea is also 
appropriated by Berman8 - Rosenstock-Huessy’s understanding of religion bypasses the 
Enlightenment division between superstition and natural reasonableness, which invariably places 
religion under the rubric of superstition, by going back to a more ancient insight lost on the 
enlightened philosophes. The bypass is not a metaphysical decision – indeed Rosenstock-Huessy 
has little patience with any metaphysics. Rosenstock-Huessy trusts language far more than 
                                                          
8 ‘Religion helps to give society the faith it needs to ace the future.’ Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of 
Law and Revolution,  3.  
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metaphysics – the later being what Schelling had called a negative philosophy, the product of 
abstractions; while language  merely points to a vast array of names and thus undeniable 
positivities, whose metaphysical, ontological or epistemological nature or characteristics is of, at 
best, secondary importance to the larger semantic field in which the name occurs. That is to say, 
Rosenstock-Huessy does not accept that some people are religious and others not – for him the 
question is simply ‘to which religion do people belong?’ And the answer to that question is not 
dictated by what they merely consciously say they are doing, but by what they are really doing, 
which is actually often most conspicuous in what they say unconsciously. The philosophes, for 
example, are servants of science and reason, and that is their religion. Of course, Robespierre did 
try to create a religion befitting the philosophes, with his Supreme Being of Reason before any 
such ritual was itself seen as an unnecessarily irrational act. A god, for Rosenstock-Huessy, was 
the name that ancient peoples traditionally gave to the powers of life they served, and the modern 
decision to dispense with the name of god, while ostensibly a metaphysical act, was far more 
importantly a philological act based on the fact that old names no longer made sense to them. 
Further, Rosenstock-Huessy does not find in the least convincing either the Enlightened 
metaphysical template erected by men like Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Diderot, Voltaire  
and Rousseau, or the metaphysical template such men thought they were largely rebelling 
against. But he does think that if their metaphysics were unreal, that does not mean they created 
a new semantic field, from which the moderns generally have retaken their orientation towards 
life. That semantic field at its origin was either  ahistorical, as in Descartes, who, in the first of 
his Discourses on Method,  see fables and histories as more or less the same, or Hobbes and 
Locke and Rousseau, whose social contract theories are all based upon atomistic self 
consciousnesses deciding what they need from a society  and thus building it from the ground up, 
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or essentially an exercise in rewriting history as in Spinoza who distinguishes between the wild 
(religious) imaginings of peoples and their actual history as grasped by the understanding. In 
Spinoza’s case, his biblical criticism creates a cleavage between men and their beliefs which is 
still conspicuous in all sorts of historical writings. Norman Davies’ large  volume Europe:  A 
History, for example, pays the scantiest attention to Christianity, as it focuses on far more 
contemporary interests of ‘forgotten’ peoples  - as if these European peoples were not deeply 
immersed in the symbols and structures of their religion.  
The methodological innovation of the speech thinking of Rosenstock-Huessy and 
Rosenzweig was named ‘absolute empiricism’ by Rosenzweig because it refused to make the 
Spinozian distinction between the pure understanding and the imagination, and instead insisted 
upon the relationship between the names people served, and their actions. This was why what 
and who we serve was for Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy a central question that every 
social body asks itself, and why the posing of such  a question gives you a clue to the faith, hope, 
and loves that govern a society. That people in secular societies still create their future through 
their faith, hope and love showed both of them that modern people were not beyond religion, 
rather that many of them simply did not understand it because they had bought into the truncated 
vocabulary that accompanied the Enlightenment’s binary of naturalism and moral freedom 
(Kant, of course, detected and expressed most systematically its metaphysical shape.) And that 
people, even those who could think of themselves as Christians - could serve Hitler was simply 
one more piece of evidence for Rosenstock-Huessy’s  idea that people are by nature serving 
creatures needing orientation into a future, which is to say human beings are religious, and their 
religion is (as the word itself indicates)  is the binds via which they make their own future .9 
                                                          
9 Cf. Rosenstock-Huessy’s  Hitler and Israel, or On Prayer.  
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For Rosenstock-Huessy, if religion is what binds us to our future, the names we use are 
the means by which we ‘seal’ our understanding of the meaning of things, and events. Thus , for 
Rosenstock-Huessy, history and language form an integral relations with each other. As he wrote 
to his student Cynthia Harris: “Language is the vehicle on which history invades the animal life 
of man. And the study of history and the study of language are one and the same study.”10 This 
emphasis upon history being created by collective acts of faith – by religion – and embedded in 
the names and speech acts of  a people was conspicuous seven in  Rosenstock-Huessy’s early 
writings on constitutional law. As Wolfgang Ullmann has noted his early writings   had 
“generalized Savigny’s 1912 thoughts on a grammar of law, emphasizing the consciousness-
forming power of law and speech.” 11  
It was this linkage between social formation, language, and religion that had completely 
overpowered the young Franz Rosenzwegi when he met Rosenstock-Huessy. In the case of 
Rosenstock-Huessy himself, his insights had been developing very early in his life, and they had 
led him to become a Christian – because, for him, Christianity was not simply or even primarily 
a matter of personal faith, but it was an assemblage of insights into the nature of speech, time and 
history, and the relationship between love, life and death. Briefly, Christianity had understood 
that: the word makes flesh, that is, that our speech is a way for making ourselves and our world, 
and not simply a means for describing things; the way to create a future is through creative, self-
sacrificial loving acts; that creatures and their institutions are not cyclical as the Greeks believed, 
but through institutions is possible to unify peoples across the ages and build upon different 
                                                          
10 The First Cycle of Letters to Cynthia (Harris): On Tribe, Egypt and Israel in order to find direction in our Era, in 
The Collected Works on Dvd  (Argo, 2005) (Microfilm 378, Reel 7, 173). 
11 Wolfgang Ullmann, “The Discovery of the New Thinking: The Leipzig Conversation on Religion and the 
Correspondence between Eugen Rosenstock and Franz Rosenzweig about Judaism and Christianity.” Translated by 
Roland Vogt, in The Cross and The Star: Post-Nietzschean Revivals of Judaism and Christianity, (eds.) Wayne 
Cristaudo and Frances Huessy, (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009), 77.  
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bodies of time; that death is not the end but rather the beginning of something, thus the 
importance of being prepared to die into a new form of life (metanoia). These insights would run 
through the entire corpus of Rosenstock-Huessy, and it was such ideas that attracted 
Rosenzweig, who had been born a Jew, but, until meeting Rosenstock-Huessy, did not think it 
was possible to be a man of faith and a philosopher. So taken by Rosenstock-Huessy’s 
understanding of the society around him – as a Christian creation that had lost its way through 
the failure of Christian peoples to understand their own heritage – that Rosenzweig was going to 
follow Rosenstock-Huessy into the Christian faith. But just prior to doing so he decided to visit 
Yom Kippur and have one last farewell to his Jewish heritage. It struck him during that service 
that he had to remain a Jew.  
The central ideas that occurred to Rosenzweig and which would find expression in The 
Star of Redemption were that the Christian faith is completely dependent upon the Jewish faith – 
for it is that faith which first provides what Rosenzweig calls the revealed law – the 
commandment to love God and the neighbor, and  it is that faith that first  emphasizes that God, 
man and world form an intrinsic relationship so that the purpose of existence, or what  he calls 
creation, which is disclosed through the revealed law of love, is to participate in redemption – 
that is to be part of a world and to have a self and a God which are all connected by love.  
According to Rosenzweig, Jewish ceremonies and rituals and feast-days are all testaments to the 
fact that the Jewish people have been elected by God to be the eternal people whose lives are 
devoted to being a constant reminder of God’s eternal love. The Jews are, in Rosenzweig’s 
terms, ‘the coals in the fire.’ That is to say, being God’s elect is being forced to suffer with God 
in so far as the future state of redemption is not yet, and to dwell in the  knowledge of the gap 
between the future redeemed time and the time that is now, the time of injustice, human cruelty 
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and suffering, a time not yet adequately infused by love. Accordign to Rosenzweig, amongst all 
ancient peoples, the Jews were unique in holding this belief in their election and in the 
intrinsically loving  relationship between God, man and world.  But with the event of 
Christianity, the Jewish people had to accept the fact that essentially the same fundamental 
message about creation, revelation and redemption  had been appropriated by Christianity. 
According to Rosenzweig,  the fact that Jews and Christians share the same God (albeit, he also 
believes, that the Christians idolatrize Him through their divinization of Jesus Christ), and the 
same faith in the end of days, or in the messianic age means that in spite of the ‘eternal enmity’ 
between these two ‘peoples’, they are both servants of the one God, who is God of the living and 
the dead. But their tasks are very different – unlike Jews who are born Jews, Christians must 
become Christians, and this becoming is intrinsic to the Christian attempt to universalize, i.e. to 
enfold all peoples within the one faith  in the revelatory, redemptive, loving God. Thus whereas 
the Jews are Jews by blood, and have no need of ‘recruiting’ others into their eternal dwelling 
place, Christians are a people of history. They ever look to what the calls the rays of the star of 
redemption (a star made up of six overlapping points – God, man, world, and creation, 
revelation, redemption), and in their striving Christians seek to ever build the kingdom that the 
Jews anticipate and celebrate in their annual cycle of rituals. He argued also that unlike 
Christianity, the fundamentals of Islam were so different from Judaism that it could not be 
convincingly argued that Allah and Yahweh were one and the same God, or even that Muslims 
and Jews meant the same thing by revelation. 
Rosenzweig’s book was a very strange and timely book – and its strangeness and 
timeliness come down to the fact that it was written just as anti-Semitism had started to become 
endemic in Germany, something he well knew. The purpose of the book had been twofold – first 
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to convince German liberal Jews to return to their heritage by showing them its profundity and 
truth, and second to have other Germans appreciate their own Christian history, and their 
dependency upon Judaism. Seen from the terrible events of Hitlerism, one can say the book was 
a gesture to try and remind Christian Germans of who they were, and not to succumb to the 
temptation of anti-Christian and anti-Jewish paganism, which is precisely what Nazism was.   
Rosenzweig’s book was to have a profound effect on Rosenstock-Huessy, who came to 
see that he and Rosenzweig had jointly created a new kind of dialogical philosophy, whereby 
difference and even enmity, did not discount forming a united front. Rosenstock-Huessy agreed 
with Rosenzweig that in comparison to Judaism, Christianity was above all a religion of time, a 
religion which used time   in its redemptive mission. I should add here that neither Rosenzweig 
nor Rosenstock-Huessy were interested in faith as a means to an after-life, but rather to how 
love, life and death conspired in this world and this life – and to this extent they remained ever 
(post-)Nietzscheans. For both Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, this use of time is very 
conspicuous in the different phases of the Church – and what interests them (an idea also 
anticipated by Schelling) is how the church can be seen has having three distinct ages – what 
they call the Petrine (Roman Church), Pauline (protestant), and Johannine Church. Whereas the 
distinction between the Petrine and Pauline Church revolves around the respective emphasis 
upon the visible role of the Church in terms of office, works, and its renunciation of worldly 
things by the Petrine church, and the spiritualization of the world  through the adoption of the 
Church as an invisible power  by the Protestant faith, the Johannine Church is one which 
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dispenses altogether with traditional Christian  institutional props – it is a Church of hope, but 
one which still requires commitment to the spirit of the law of love.12  
In the case of Rosenstock-Huessy, these ideas were developed in far greater depth, but 
the two which concern me here are  his argument that the Petrine Church created unity within the 
peoples of Western and Central Europe, and secondly that it was in the territories  that unity had 
been achieved, that the sequence of total revolutions – the Papal revolution, the Italian revolution 
or Renaissance, the German revolution or Reformation, the English revolution, the French 
revolution, and the Russian revolution - took place.   With the exception of the French and 
Russian revolutions, all of these revolutions were explicitly formulated within the Christian 
framework. They were fuelled both by a deep faith that the end of times was near, and that all 
obstacles to a redeemed world had to be overthrown. It was because of the deep rooted belief in 
the power of love to redeem the world, that people were so fired up by the hatefulness of the 
social and politically and religiously entrenched forms of cruelty and domination. While the 
obstacles to the end of times keeps changing over time, and thus makes the focus of each 
revolution different, it is the same explosive  hostility that is directed , in different revolutions, to 
the obstacles of the messianic age. Those obstacles have built up over protracted periods of 
failure to bring into alliance the neighbourly love demanded by God and  the Christian  Church 
(and of course, the Synagogue) and the institutions and social practices of the Christian nations. 
Thus for Rosenstock-Huessy, the sequence of revolutions has indeed supplied the sense of 
progress – something that made absolutely no sense in the pre-Christian age – that the 
Enlightenment took for granted. Except, for Rosenstock-Huessy this progress was not something 
                                                          
12 Both Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy see the break away from Rome by the  Eastern Orthodox Church as a 
decision to break away from the Church has a historical force. The consequence, of this decision, was that the 
Orthodox Church instead of remaining more pure, as its intention had been, was to make it ossify. Thus it was that 
the first atheistic revolution would take place where the Church had been most ‘out of time.’ 
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natural, nor, as Kant or Hegel would have it either a regulative idea of reason (Kant), or the 
unfolding of reason in history (Hegel). Rather, it was the result of each body of time of being 
radically reconfigured by a revolution, then the fruits of those revolutions spilling out and 
circulating through the Western Christian nations. That same reconfiguration and spill-over 
which accompanied the triumphs of each major European revolution  did not cease with the last 
two great European revolutions which were, respectively, anti-Christian and atheistic. Moreover, 
it is a fact that  neither the French nor the Russian revolutionaries noted how deeply implicated 
they were in the prior revolutions that took place within the Christian nations – the French 
having already rewritten history into its now familiar post-Enlightenment episodes, of dark ages, 
middle ages, renaissance, reformation etc., the Russians into their Marxian schema of feudal, 
bourgeois, socialist revolution.  (Of course the Enlightenment distinction between the 
enlight3ened and superstitious becomes appropriated by the Marxist distinction between 
bourgeois and socialist social orders and revolutions.)  But  the eschatological nature of both 
revolutions, and the totalizing and universalizing ambitions of the revolution were still part of a 
deeply Christian heritage, a sense of the future calling to the present, and the past as shaped by 
the end of time, and not simply a mechanical random causality. That is to say, in so far as each 
revolution had built upon the inherited sense of time, embodied in the institutional and 
aspirational circulation throughout the European nations (and beyond), even their anti-Christian 
motivations counted for little in comparison with their Christian heritage. Furthermore,  
Rosenstock-Huessy’s analysis of the French and Russian revolutions brilliantly shows how the 
local conditions of Christianity fueled their anti-Christian rhetoric and tactics, but it is their 
revolutionary ends that makes them part of a greater historical wave than they care to recognize.  
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In the case of France, for example, it was the failure to respond deeply enough to the 
Reformation, that left the French Catholic Church so deeply reactionary. Rosenstock-Huessy 
makes much of the University of Paris’ complicity in the St. Bartholomew massacre, and the 
depth of that wound  in the memory of the exiled Huguenots. His analysis of the French 
revolution is deeply sensitive to the long term effect of events. Thus he gives a great deal of 
importance to the attempt by the French crown to maneuvere its way through the religious 
conflicts that were part of the fallout of the Reformation  by bolstering its power through its 
deployment of the representatives of les pays, who would become the parasitical nobles. 
Likewise he notes the importance of the alienation between the crown and the people of Paris, 
the short term gains and long term disaster of the move to Versailles, and the role of the 
corruption of the Church in creating anti-Christian humanism. But in so far as the French 
revolutionary government insisted upon equal rights for Jews, and in so far as they sought an 
institutional basis  for a more just and free society, they were, according to Rosenstock-Huessy, 
continuing in the vein precipitated by Gregory VII in the Papal revolution.   
Rosenstock-Huessy’s analysis of the Russian revolution, takes a similar kind of tack. He 
believes that the failure of Russia to have adequately reformed itself in the earlier revolutions – 
that is, the almost complete  isolation of the Orthodox church from other religious events in 
Europe meant that the firs t revolution to have really impacted in Russia was the French 
revolution –and even the fall-out from that revolution had only limited effect in a society which 
had not adequately benefitted from the property rights that the English revolution had so 
valorized. Rosenstock-Huessy nicely  picks up on how the Russian revolutionaries 
simultaneously wanted to depict themselves in terms of the French revolution, whilst negating 
the former’s importance because it was merely bourgeois.   
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Now while most people are not familiar with the Papal revolution, and so have no idea of 
its logistical importance, for subsequent European events, everyone is aware of the importance of 
the other revolutions. And if one tried to imagine a world, without the effects of the great 
revolutions, one would simply be thrown back into a world before the World Wars, before the 
existence of nation states, before the great scientific and commercial revolutions – and this 
conference would not be taking place, and certainly not in a place called the People’s Republic 
of China. The fall-outs of revolutions are not always easy to see, especially, as in the case of the 
Russian Revolution which many would argue was a total failure. Yet against this position Harold 
Berman has provided a nice summary of the global spillovers from the Russian revolution in 
terms of law.  
the twin legal innovations introduced by the Russian revolution – the enormous 
enhancement of the social and economic role of the state and the parallel 
enhancement of the parental role of law – have survived and have had the 
repercussions throughout the West and the world. 
In virtually all countries of the West, governmental bureaucracies in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries have come to control, directly and actively the 
economy, communications, education, health care, conditions of word, and other 
aspects of economic and social life.   To  a large extent these are governed by 
administrative regulations. By no means entirely, but nevertheless to a 
considerable extent, administrative regulation as a major source of law has 
invaded the civil code in France, common law precedents in England, and 
professorial concepts and principles in Germany. In the United States as well, 
though not to the same extent, both legislatures and courts have yielded to 
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government agencies much of their control over large parts of economic and 
social life. . At the same time. American courts have themselves become to a 
certain extent agencies of active control of econ0omic and social life, as so-called 
judicial activism has increasingly become openly accepted.  
The use of law to implement direct state regulation of economic and social 
activities has been linked in our time with the use of law directly to influence 
people’s belief and attitudes, to educate people to be socially responsible, and to 
treat one another equally, regardless of differences in race or gender or age or 
class. More and more we see the socializing functions of the family, the school, 
the church, the factory, the commercial enterprise, and other local associations 
subjected to direct legislative, administrative, and judicial controls.13 
 
While the aim of the Christian Church was universal and while, as Rosenzweig rightly said, in 
spreading its teaching, even in spite of its frequent bouts of Jewish persecution it was teaching a 
message which meant that the society should be governed by the law of love first believed in by 
the Jews, it was the French and, finally the Russian revolutions which truly universalized that 
law. While the above citation from Berman emphasizes the enduring legal contribution made by 
the Russian revolution beyond Russia, the political contribution of that revolution was even 
greater. The Russian revolution, but that it fueled a number of revolutionary regimes, in nations 
which had failed to adequately materialize on the basis of the more bourgeois precepts and 
possibilities that evolved with the French revolution, and amongst them, of course was China. 
From Rosenstock-Huessy’s point of view, it was the Russian revolution, far more than Christian 
                                                          
13 Law and Revolution, Vol. II, 20-21. 
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missionaries that bought Christianity into China, albeit a secularized Johannine form of 
Christianity. 
 I have mentioned earlier that for Rosenstock-Huessy the great European revolutions build 
upon each other, forming a sequence – a schematic expression of the sequence and the ends of 
each revolution is supplied in  the following table from Out of Revolution:i 
Russia: Every proletarian a capitalist. 
France: Every man of talent an aristocrat. 
England: Every gentleman a king. 
Germany: Every Christian a priest. 
Although he does not include it in the table, Out of Revolution also provides the material for the 
two earliest revolutionary slogans – every human creature a soul (Odilo of Cluny’s original 
revolutionary programme), and every soul a member of the Church (The Gregorian revolution 
that spreads into the Franciscan revolt of the Italian revolution). 
 Before I conclude the essay, there is one more important point that needs to be made 
about Rosenstock-Huessy’s analysis of how the European revolutions have shaped the planet we 
now are all conscious of sharing as neighbours, and I will just use the examples of the French 
and Russian (and the Chinese revolution which is, as I have implied throughout, an extension of 
the Russian revolution).  The  internal/ national obstacles to social transformation invariably are 
the very elements of decay which lead to a revolutionary explosion. In France, for example, as 
we suggested, the failure of the Church to adequately accommodate the legitimate grievances 
and cries to heaven from the protestants, the failure of  the monarch and nobles to hear the cries 
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of the rising commercial classes and the poor, ultimately meant there was no way to change 
except by exploding the existing order. Russia’s failure to spread the Enlightenment beyond its 
ruling class and a small group of intellectuals who found themselves persecuted because of their 
opposition to Russia’s feudalism and general backwardness created a revolutionary elite 
determined to go beyond the bourgeois purview which had led to the First Wordl War. 
Rosenstock-Huessy had noted in his early work, written in the penumbra of the Great War, 
which can be translated as the The Marriage of War and Revolution, that it was the Bolshevik 
opposition to the War that had been the source of success, not the purity of its Marxism. But its 
Marxism provided a vantage point to view the limitations of the horizon of the French 
revolution. However, as he also grasped, because he European revolutions each solved a problem 
for the species, the fact that a revolution inevitably occurs in societies which have not been 
sufficiently transformed or reconfigured by earlier revolutions means that each revolutionary 
regime must ultimately serve to enable its peoples to accrue the benefits won by earlier 
revolutions. As we now the Russian revolutionary regimes dismantled itself in its attempt to 
accrue the benefits that had flown from the French and English revolutions. The Chinese 
government, on the other hand, rightly in my view, saw the potential chaos of such dismantling 
and thus has more cautiously sought internal economic change, based on the English and French 
revolutionary emphasis upon private property and the sovereignty of the nation. That is to say, 
China is now entering ever more deeply into the sequential revolutionary history of the West, 
which has spawned the global economic, financial, commercial, technological, administrative, 
legislative, and political systems. These systems were all the outcomes of specific historical, 
social and political struggles. They all originated in the West, on Christian soil, but now they are 
completely dislocated from any religious origins. The danger of this is not only, as Berman has 
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suggested, the social amnesia of people who fail to sense any continuity between origins and 
ends  - a continuity which would at least have the benefit of emphasizing the deeply human 
creative and redemptive need of solidarity. The danger is that the hegemonic role that the West 
must play because it spawned the systems which engulf the world is not well understood by the 
West itself, which, to repeat Berman is having an ‘integrity crisis.’ That crisis comes from its 
deep sense of sham eand guilt – one might say this is the Rousseauian legacy of the 
Enlightenment, a legacy which paradoxically has substituted origi9nal innocence for original sin 
whilst making us deeply regretful of our sinful history. An alternative theological reading of 
history is Augustine’s and it is the reading of history which tended to dominate the European 
mind-set before the French revolution – viz, we are sinful but God is providential, thus our 
history may be purposeful and contribute to the end of times in spite of the need for us to 
acknowledge our past sins, in spite of our guilt and our shame.  
 If, then, as I am suggesting the West needs to accept its responsibility by also paying 
more attention to what it stands for, it is also the case – and both Rosenstock-Huessy and Berman 
make this very point – that the different histories and socio-cultural traditions of non Western 
peoples also now feeds into and plays an indispensable role in forming the one world we all 
inhabit. However, the various non-western traditions inevitably find themselves being radically 
reconstituted by the revolutionary systems within which they now operate. Revolutions are by 
their nature the result of great disorder which then gives birth to a new order.  
The real event of the last century which, as Rosenstock-Huessy correctly grasped, which 
had forcefully brought together all the nations into one world, was the World Wars, which were 
themselves part of the overflow of Europe’s history of revolutions. It is a shame that Berman 
never completed his intended analysis of the relationship of laws and revolutions, and that age 
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forced him to stop with the English revolution. His work, however, has performed the invaluable 
contribution of making people who are serious in understanding the world we have inherited 
conscious of the deep relationship between law and religion. And anyone in the West who does 
not want to be a social amnesiac, or anyone from non-Western countries wanting to understand 






                                                          
i Out, p. 365. 
